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Abstract
We examine the endogenous choice between price and quantity be-
haviour in a duopoly supergame with product diﬀerentiation. We find
that (i) if cartel profits are evenly split between firms, then only sym-
metric equilibria obtains; (i) if instead the additional profits available
through collusion are split according to the Nash bargaining solution,
there are parameter regions where all subgame perfect equilibria are
asymmetric, with firms colluding in price-quantity supergames.
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1 Introduction
A large body of literature has examined the relative stability of collusion
in Bertrand and Cournot markets, parametrised over the degree of product
diﬀerentiation.1 Relatively few, instead, allow for the possibility that firms
be asymmetric in terms of their market variables, considering thus price-
quantity supergames (Lambertini, 1997; Albæk and Lambertini, 2004). In
Rothschild (1995) and Lambertini and Schultz (2001, 2003), the possibility
that firms optimally choose whether to be price- or quantity-setters in each
period is considered. Notwithstanding the fact that firms are allowed to select
diﬀerent market variables, from none of these contributions there emerge
asymmetric cartels at the subgame perfect equilibria. Does this entail that
antitrust agencies must not worry about such types of collusive behaviour?
The underlying symmetry between firms, in terms of technology and product
diﬀerentiation, that is a consistent feature of the models belonging to this
stream of literature seems to provide an intuitive explanation for this result.
Moreover, neither Lambertini (1997) nor Albæk and Lambertini (2004)
investigate which market variable yields the highest profit to the implicit
cartel members for a given discount factor. Instead, they identify the lowest
discount factor compatible with a subgame perfect equilibrium where firms
stabilise collusion at the monopoly profits, being committed to set quantities
or prices in all phases of the infinitely repeated duopoly game. Then, under
the assumption that firms are able to collude along the frontier of industry
profits irrespective of the market variable(s) being set, a meta-game is intro-
duced, whereby firms choose market variables once and for all, the payoﬀs
1The number of contributions in this field is very large. See Deneckere (1983, 1984),
Majerus (1988), Ross (1992), Rothschild (1992), Albæk and Lambertini (1998) and Lam-
bertini and Sasaki (1999, 2002), inter alia.
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being the smallest discount factors needed for sustaining the monopoly out-
come in the repeated game given the market variable(s). In this meta-game
firms are supposed to prefer small discount factors. These papers show that
a prisoners’ dilemma may arise in the meta-game where firms choose the
market variable(s), i.e., that the latter may be ineﬃcient.
The present paper nests into the existing literature on the stability of col-
lusion and its relation with product diﬀerentiation. We partly rely upon the
analysis carried out in Lambertini (1997) and Albæk and Lambertini (2004),
with a relevant departure from their line of research. That is, we still sup-
pose that the choice of any given market variable is a long-run commitment
to be taken at the outset in the meta-game, but we assume that the relevant
payoﬀ in the meta-game are given by discounted profit flows. We shall ex-
amine two diﬀerent setups: one where cartel profits are split evenly between
firms, and the other where, in asymmetric (i.e., price-quantity) supergames,
the additional profits attainable through collusion are split according to the
Nash bargaining solution. These two alternatives have largely diﬀerent con-
sequences in terms of subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes. In the game
with equal split only symmetric equilibria arises, and firms collude along the
subgame perfect equilibrium path if and only if both of them are either price-
or quantity-setters. The outcome is significantly diﬀerent if collusive profits
are split following a Nash bargaining solution in the asymmetric cases. If so,
there exist parameter ranges (where product diﬀerentiation as well as firms’
discount factors are suﬃciently low) in which firms are indeed able to sta-
bilise price-quantity cartels at the pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibria.
That is, asymmetric market behaviour, if combined with Nash bargaining
over cartel profits, helps firms collude in such a way that, when a priori sym-
metric firms are unable to sustain either Bertrand or Cournot cartels, they
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may nonetheless activate price-quantity cartels along the frontier of industry
profits.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The demand system
id laid out in section 2. Section 3 describes the meta-game. the critical
discount factors for each possible supergame are listed in section 4. The
analysis of subgame perfect equilibria is in section 5. Section 6 contains a
few concluding remarks.
2 Setup
Two firms, labelled i and j, supply the market with a single product each.
Firm i’s inverse demand function is
pi = 1− qi − γqj, (1)
where γ ∈ (0, 1] denotes the degree of substitutability between the two prod-
ucts. If γ = 0, firms are independent monopolists, therefore we shall exclude
this case in the remainder of the analysis.
The direct demand function faced by firm i is:
qi =
1
1 + γ −
1
1− γ2pi +
γ
1− γ2pj. (2)
When instead firm i acts as a quantity-setter while firm j is a price-setter,
their respective demand functions are:
pi = 1− qi + γ(pj + γqi − 1); (3)
qj = 1− pj − γqi. (4)
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For the sake of simplicity, we assume firms operate at constant returns to
scale and, without further loss of generality, we normalise the marginal cost
to zero. Accordingly, each firm’s profit function corresponds to revenue,
πi = piqi.
3 The meta-game
The concept of extended game is due to Hamilton and Slutsky (1990; HS
henceforth). They consider the extension, out of real time, of the basic
duopoly game taking place in real time, in order to endogenise firms’ choices
as to the timing of moves in the market. This yields a two-stage game,
where the first stage concerns the timing, and the second describes market
subgames.2 Their approach can be adopted to investigate the choice of the
market variable as well.
To this aim, consider first an extended or meta-game where firms non-
cooperatively choose the market variable, knowing that the ensuing market
competition takes the form of a one-shot game G1. We shall adopt here
a symbology which largely replicates that in HS (1990, p. 32). Define
Γ1,1 = (N,Σ,Π) the extended game. The superscript indicates that both
the extension and the basic market game are one-shot. The set of players
(or firms) is N = {i, j} ; αi and αj are the compact and convex intervals
of R representing the actions available to i and j in the basic game. Π is
the payoﬀ function. Payoﬀs depend on the actions undertaken in the basic
2HS consider (i) an extended game with observable delay, where firms declare the instant
at which they will move, without announcing any particular action; and (ii) an extended
game with action commitment, where firms must commit to a specific price or quantity
level. The meta-game we describe is conceptually similar to their game with observable
delay.
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(market) game, according to the following functions, πi : αi × αj → R and
πj : αj × αi → R. The set of market variables from which firms can choose
is V = {p, q}. The set of strategies for player i is Σi = {p, q} × Φi, where
Φi is the set of functions mapping V × V into αi (or αj). Let πhki define the
one-shot Nash equilibrium profits for firm i, when it chooses market variable
h and the rival chooses market variable k, with h, k ∈ {p, q}. The reduced
form of the meta-game can be described as in Matrix 1.3
j
p q
i p πppi , π
pp
j π
pq
i , π
qp
j
q πqpi , π
pq
j π
qq
i , π
qq
j
Matrix 1: the one-shot meta-game
This is the game analysed by Singh and Vives (1984), using the demand
functions introduced in the previous section. Since πqpi ≥ π
pp
i and π
qq
i >
πpqi for all γ ∈ (0, 1], they conclude that firms play the symmetric Cournot
equilibrium.
Consider now a meta-game Γ1,∞, where the extension is again a one-
shot choice over the set V = {p, q}, but market interaction takes place over
an infinite horizon, t ∈ [0,∞), giving rise to a supergame G∞. Denote
the individual (common) discount factor of players as δ ∈ [0, 1] .4 In this
3Notice that the extended game envisaged here maintains that firms commit to a strate-
gic market variable for the whole duration of the supergame. Alternatively, one could think
of a situation where agents can switch from one variable to the other depending upon the
profit incentives characterising each phase of the supergame, i.e., the collusive path, the
deviation phase and the punishment. This perspective is considered in Rothschild (1995)
and Lambertini and Schultz (2001, 2003).
4Although in line of principle players might have diﬀerent time preferences, the assump-
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case, firms can collude in the relevant market variable(s), relying upon an
infinite Nash reversion to deter deviations from the collusive path (Friedman,
1971).5 That is, we assume that firms either fully collude along the frontier
of monopoly profits or play the one-shot Nash equilibrium in the relevant
market variable(s). Firms are able to sustain collusion iﬀ
πhkiC
1− δ ≥ π
hk
iD +
δ
1− δ · π
hk
iN (5)
where subscripts C, D, and N identify cartel, deviation and Nash profits,
respectively. Let δhk define the critical discount factor above which firms can
indeed collude in the repeated market game; then, the discounted flow of
profits accruing to firm i is:
Ψhki ≡
πhkiC
1− δ if δ ≥ max
©
δhk, δkh
ª
;
Ψhki ≡
δ
1− δ · π
hk
iN if δ ≤ max
©
δhk, δkh
ª
.
(6)
Accordingly, the reduced form of the extended or meta-game Γ1,∞ is a
2× 2 matrix analogous to Matrix 1, with either πhkiC/ (1− δ) or δπhkiN/ (1− δ)
replacing πhki as appropriate. The list of admissible outcomes is defined by
Λ ≡ {(p, p), (p, q), (q, p), (q, q)} . Given the symmetry of the model, one of
the following situations must arise:
• any admissible outcome of the reduced form of Γ1,∞ is an equilibrium;
tion of common time discounting involves no loss of generality. If we assumed δi 6= δj ,
then min {δi, δj} would determine whether any given cartel is sustainable or not.
5In line of principle, the use of optimal punishments a` la Abreu (1986) and Fudenberg
and Maskin (1986) would be preferable, but this is prevented by the analytical diﬃcul-
ties associated with characterising optimal punishments in asymmetric games with price-
and quantity-setting. For supergames with optimal penal codes, see Ha¨ckner (1996) and
Lambertini and Sasaki (1999, 2002), inter alia.
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• Γ1,∞ is a coordination game, with equilibria (p, p) and (q, q);
• Γ1,∞ is a chicken game, with equilibria (p, q) and (q, p);
• Γ1,∞ has a unique equilibrium, either (p, p) or (q, q). If so, two subcases
are possible. Either the unique equilibrium is Pareto-eﬃcient, or not,
i.e., the game is a Prisoners’ Dilemma.
• no pure-strategy equilibrium exists.
The subgame perfect equilibrium outcome(s) will of course depend upon
the value of parameters γ and δ.
4 The critical discount factors
Consider the market supergame G∞. Since we rely upon “grim” strategies
(Friedman, 1971) to model the supergame, we may borrow from Deneckere
(1983, 1984) the following discount factors characterising the Cournot and
Bertrand settings, respectively:
δqq = (γ + 2)
2
γ2 + 8γ + 8; δ
pp =
(γ − 2)2
γ2 − 8γ + 8; γ ∈
³
0,
√
3− 1
´
, (7)
δqq = (γ + 2)
2
γ2 + 8γ + 8; δ
pp =
(2− γ)2(γ2 + γ − 1)
(2− γ)2(γ2 + γ − 1) + γ4 ; γ ∈
h√
3− 1, 1
i
,
where superscript qq (pp) indicates that both firms set quantities (resp.,
prices). The threshold value γ =
√
3−1 identifies the level of substitutability
above which deviation from the collusive path drives a loyal price-setting firm
out of business.
As δqq < δpp for all γ ∈ (0, 0.96155) , Deneckere (1983) concludes that
Cournot behavior ensures greater stability of the cartel agreement than does
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Bertrand behavior, unless products are very close substitutes. However, ob-
serve that δqq is everywhere increasing in γ, while δpp is non-monotone in
γ, with a maximum at γ = 2
¡√
10− 2
¢
/3 ' 0.774852. This means that a
cartel in quantities becomes less stable as product substitutability increases,
while, over most of the relevant range of γ, the opposite holds for a cartel in
prices. As stressed in previous literature (Deneckere, 1983; Lambertini and
Sasaki, 1999, 2002), this depends on the fact that the balance between the
temptation to deviate and the harshness of the punishment goes in opposite
directions in the two cases. The performance of δpp is also noteworthy in
relation with the corresponding critical threshold emerging from Hotelling
models, where the minimum discount factor required to stabilise price col-
lusion increases as product diﬀerentiation decreases (see Chang, 1991, 1992;
Ross, 1992; Ha¨ckner, 1996). This is due to the assumption, usually adopted
in Hotelling models, of a price-inelastic market demand, whereby the overall
number of consumers being served in each phase of the supergame is inde-
pendent of the pricing behaviour of firms in that particular phase.
When firms use diﬀerent market variables, the demand functions are (3)
and (4). Straightforward computations yield the following Nash equilibrium
profits:
πqpiN =
(γ − 2)2(1− γ2)
(3γ2 − 4)2 ; π
pq
jN =
(γ − 1)2(γ + 2)2
(3γ2 − 4)2 (8)
where firm i is a quantity-setter, while firm j is a price-setter. The max-
imization of joint profits requires qiC = 1/(2(1 + γ)) and pjC = 1/2. This
pair of strategies yields total cartel profits equal to monopoly profits, πM =
1/(2(1 + γ)) with each firm being entitled to half the cartel profits, i.e.,
πqpiC = π
pq
jC = πM/2.
As to the deviation phase, the individually optimal deviation output
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(price) when the other firm sticks to the collusive price (output) corresponds
to qiD = 1/(2γ) and pjD = (2+γ)/(4(1+γ)). Notice that qiD coincides with
the monopoly output, given only one firm on the market, since the deviation
by the quantity setting firm drives the price setting firm completely out of
the market. The corresponding deviation profits are:6
πqpiD =
2γ − 1
4γ2 ; π
pq
jD =
(γ + 2)2
16(1 + γ)2 (9)
yielding the following profits for the firm being cheated:
πpqj = 0; π
qp
i =
2 + 2γ − γ2
8(γ + 1)2 (10)
Since πqpiD > π
qp
iC > π
qp
iN > π
qp
i , and π
pq
jD > π
pq
jC > π
pq
jN > π
p
j hold for the
quantity-setter and the price-setter, respectively, the mixed situation where
firms optimize in diﬀerent variables reproduces the Prisoners’ Dilemma. As
in the pure price or quantity games, a Pareto-improvement on the non-
cooperative outcome can be reached in the repeated game over an infinite
horizon, if firms i and j ’s discount factors are at least as high as the critical
thresholds, defined as:
δqp = π
qp
iD − π
qp
iC
πqpiD − π
qp
iN
; δpq = π
pq
iD − π
pq
iC
πpqiD − π
pq
iN
, (11)
where superscript qp (pq) indicates that the discount factor is computed for
the quantity-setter (price-setter), and πqpiC = π
pq
iC = πM/2. After some simple
albeit tedious calculations, one finds that the individual discount factors must
satisfy the following inequalities:
δi ≥ δqp =
(3γ2 − 4)2
(γ − 2)2(8− 7γ2); γ ∈
³
0,
√
3− 1
´
, (12)
6For further details on the calculations concerning the asymmetric cases, we refer to
Lambertini (1997) and Albæk and Lambertini (2004).
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δi ≥ δqp =
(3γ2 − 4)2(γ2 + γ − 1)
(4γ7 + 6γ6 + 5γ5 − 29γ4 − 24γ3 + 40γ2 + 16γ − 16); γ ∈
h√
3− 1, 1
i
.
δj ≥ δpq =
(3γ2 − 4)2
(γ + 2)2(8− 7γ2); γ ∈
³
0,
√
3− 1
´
, (13)
δj ≥ δpq =
(3γ2 − 4)2
(γ + 2)2(8− 7γ2); γ ∈
h√
3− 1, 1
i
.
Alternatively, in the price-quantity case, firms could split evenly the ad-
ditional profits made available by collusion, in the light of the asymmetry
between non-cooperative profits:
bπqpiC = πqpiN + πM − πqpiN − πpqjN2 ; bπpqiC = πpqiN + πM − π
qp
iN − π
pq
jN
2
, (14)
where:
bπqpiC > πqpiC ; bπpqjC < πpqjC ∀ γ ∈ (0, 1] . (15)
If rule (14) is adopted, the critical discount factors are defined as follows:
bδqp = πqpiD − bπqpiCπqpiD − πqpiN ; bδpq = π
pq
iD − bπpqiC
πpqiD − π
pq
iN
. (16)
Again, routine calculations are required to find that the individual discount
factors must satisfy the following inequalities:
δi > bδqp = 16− 16γ − 8γ2 + 16γ3 − 7γ4
(γ − 2)2(8− 7γ2) ; γ ∈
³
0,
√
3− 1
´
, (17)
δi ≥ bδqp = 4γ7 + 9γ6 + 5γ5 − 33γ4 − 24γ3 + 40γ2 + 16γ − 16
4γ7 + 6γ6 + 5γ5 − 29γ4 − 24γ3 + 40γ2 + 16γ − 16; γ ∈
h√
3− 1, 1
i
.
δj > bδpq = 16 + 16γ − 8γ2 − 16γ3 − 7γ4
(γ + 2)2(8− 7γ2) ; γ ∈
³
0,
√
3− 1
´
, (18)
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δj ≥ bδpq = 16 + 16γ − 8γ2 − 16γ3 − 7γ4
(γ + 2)2(8− 7γ2) ; γ ∈
h√
3− 1, 1
i
.
Having derived the critical threshold of discount factors for each su-
pergame, we may proceed to investigate the upstream stage of the game.
5 The upstream stage
We are now in a position to fully characterise the subgame perfect equilibrium
behaviour of firms in the game Γ1,∞. The normal form of the upstream stage
of the game is described by Matrix 2:
j
p q
i p Ψppi ,Ψ
pp
j Ψ
pq
i ,Ψ
qp
j
q Ψqpi ,Ψ
pq
j Ψ
qq
i ,Ψ
qq
j
Matrix 2
where Ψhki is given by either πhkiC/ (1− δ) or δπhkiN/ (1− δ) , depending on
δ T max
©
δhk, δkh
ª
. We first investigate the case where firms split cartel
profits evenly.
5.1 The game with equal split
A first result immediately obtains with bo need of a formal proof:
Lemma 1 If δ ≥ max {δqp, δqq, δpp, δpq} , firms are always able to stabilise
collusion, irrespective of the market variable(s) being chosen. Otherwise, if
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δ < min {δqp, δqq, δpp, δpq} , firms are completely unable to collude. In such a
case, non-cooperative quantity-setting is a dominant strategy and firms play
a` la Cournot-Nash forever.
The first claim in the Lemma also entails that, if δ is suﬃciently high,
the choice of the market variable is indeed immaterial to firms, since they
always obtain their share of monopoly profits. The second claim summarises
the main result obtained by Singh and Vives (1984).
Now examine all the intermediate cases where
δ ∈ [min {δqp, δqq, δpp, δpq} ,max {δqp, δqq, δpp, δpq}) . (19)
The relevant sequence of the critical discount factors is:
δqp > δpp > δqq > δpq for all γ ∈ (0, 0.96155) ,
δqp > δqq ≥ δpp > δpq for all γ ∈ [0.96155, 1] .
(20)
Suppose γ ∈ (0, 0.96155) , and:
δqp > δ ≥ δpp > δqq > δpq. (21)
If so, the relevant matrix is:
j
p q
i p
πM
2 (1− δ) ,
πM
2 (1− δ)
πpqiN
1− δ ,
πqpiN
1− δ
q
πqpiN
1− δ ,
πpqiN
1− δ
πM
2 (1− δ) ,
πM
2 (1− δ)
Matrix 3
Matrix 3 represents a coordination game whose pure-strategy equilibria
are (p, p) and (q, q) , with firms colluding symmetrically, either in prices or
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in output levels. Of course, there also exist a mixed-strategy equilibrium as
well as a correlated one.
Again for γ ∈ (0, 0.96155) , suppose:
δqp > δpp > δ ≥ δqq > δpq. (22)
The reduced-form matrix becomes:
j
p q
i p
πppiN
1− δ ,
πppiN
1− δ
πpqiN
1− δ ,
πqpiN
1− δ
q
πqpiN
1− δ ,
πpqiN
1− δ
πM
2 (1− δ) ,
πM
2 (1− δ)
Matrix 4
In this case, firms collude only if both set quantities, and the game
produces a unique equilibrium in dominant strategies, (q, q) , which is also
Pareto-eﬃcient for firms.
If δqp > δpp > δ ≥ δqq > δ ≥ δpq, firms are unable to collude irrespective of
the market variables being chosen, and the equilibrium outcome is the same
as in Singh and Vives (1984), with (q, q) representing the unique equilibrium
(in dominant strategies), which is also Pareto-eﬃcient.
Now suppose γ ∈ [0.96155, 1] . To begin with, examine the case where:
δqp > δ ≥ δqq ≥ δpp > δpq. (23)
This situation is qualitatively analogous to that described in Matrix 3, so
that there are two pure-strategy equilibria, (p, p) and (q, q) , where firms can
sustain collusion. However, in mixed strategies they can be driven oﬀ the
collusive path and play one-shot asymmetric Nash equilibria.
14
If instead:
δqp > δ ≥ δqq ≥ δ ≥ δpp > δpq, (24)
the relevant matrix is:
j
p q
i p
πM
2 (1− δ) ,
πM
2 (1− δ)
πpqiN
1− δ ,
πqpiN
1− δ
q
πqpiN
1− δ ,
πpqiN
1− δ
πqqiN
1− δ ,
πqqiN
1− δ
Matrix 5
This game has also two equilibria in pure strategies, (p, p) and (q, q) , but
firms collude if and only if the are price-setters. Finally, if δqp > δ ≥ δqq ≥
δpp > δ ≥ δpq, firms never collude, ending up playing a Cournot-Nash equi-
librium forever.
The foregoing discussion is summarised by:
Proposition 2 In the game with equal split, if δ < max {δqp, δqq, δpp, δpq} ,
then only symmetric equilibria may arise. Price-quantity supergames are
never part of the subgame perfect equilibrium path.
The relative stability of Cournot and Bertrand implicit cartels is non-
monotone w.r.t. the degree of product substitutability, as it is well known
from previous literature and further stressed here, e.g., by comparing Ma-
trices 4 and 5. However, the relative profitability of price and quantity be-
haviour is such that collusion between a price- and a quantity-setter is never
to be observed along the subgame perfect equilibrium path.
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5.2 The game with Nash bargaining
Here we consider the situation where firms split additional collusive profits
as in (14), so that the relevant critical discount factors characterising the
asymmetric market supergames where one firm is a price-setter and the other
is a quantity-setters are given by (16). The equivalent of Lemma 1 also holds
here.
Then, although δqp > bδqp and bδpq > δpq, the sequence of critical discount
factors remains the same as under equal split:
bδqp > δpp > δqq > bδpq (25)
for all γ ∈
¡
0,
√
3− 1
¢
. In this range, the upstream stage of the game Γ1,∞
has exactly the same qualitative features as in the game with equal split.
Therefore, firms may collude only if they use the same market variable.
Things modify significantly when γ ∈
£√
3− 1, 1
¤
. In this parameter
region, the following sequences hold:
bδqp > δpp > δqq > bδpq for all γ ∈ h√3− 1, 0.87311´ , (26)
δpp ≥ bδqp > δqq > bδpq for all γ ∈ [0.87311, 0.93600) , (27)
δpp > δqq ≥ bδqp > bδpq for all γ ∈ [0.93600, 0.96155) , (28)
δqq ≥ δpp > bδqp > bδpq for all γ ∈ [0.96155, 1] . (29)
When γ ∈
£√
3− 1, 0.87311
¢
so that (26) holds, and:
bδqp > δ ≥ δpp > δqq > bδpq, (30)
we have a coordination game, as in Matrix 3. If instead:
bδqp > δpp > δ ≥ δqq > bδpq, (31)
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(q, q) is the unique (collusive) equilibrium in dominant strategies, as in Matrix
4. Otherwise, if δ ∈
³
δqq,bδpqi firms are unable to collude and play the
Cournot-Nash equilibrium forever.
Now suppose γ ∈ [0.87311, 0.93600) , with the relevant sequence being
(27). If
δpp ≥ δ ≥ bδqp > δqq > bδpq, (32)
both firms choose strategy q and collude. they are able to collude also when
one sets the price and the other sets the output level, but, by dominance,
a Cournot cartel emerges as the unique equilibrium. The same equilibrium
outcome also obtains if δpp ≥ bδqp > δ ≥ δqq > bδpq, where the reduced form
appears as in Matrix 4. If δ is even lower, than firms play a` la Cournot-Nash.
Then, consider γ ∈ [0.93600, 0.96155) and (28). If δpp > δ ≥ δqq ≥ bδqp >bδpq, firms always collude except in the Bertrand supergame. Dominance
establishes that (q, q) is the unique (collusive) equilibrium. If instead δpp >
δqq ≥ δ ≥ bδqp > bδpq, the reduced form of the upstream stage is:
j
p q
i p
πppiN
1− δ ,
πppiN
1− δ
bπpqiC
1− δ ,
bπqpiC
1− δ
q
bπqpiC
1− δ ,
bπpqiC
1− δ
πqqiN
1− δ ,
πqqiN
1− δ
Matrix 6
Since bπqpiC > πppiN and bπqpiC > πqqiN , Matrix 6 describes a chicken game with two
pure strategy equilibria where firms collude, (p, q) and (q, p) , plus of course
a mixed strategy equilibrium and a correlated one. If δ ∈
³bδqp,bδpqi , Singh
and Vives’s (1984) result applies.
17
Finally, if γ ∈ [0.96155, 1] and sequence (29) holds, then the reduced
form of the upstream stage is a chicken game if either δ ∈ (δqq, δpp] , sincebπqpiC > πM/2, or δ ∈ ³δpp,bδqpi , where firms play a` la Cournot- and Bertrand-
Nash along the main diagonal, while they collude otherwise.
The analysis carried out above is summarised by:
Proposition 3 In the game with Nash bargaining, if δ < max
nbδqp, δqq, δpp,bδpqo ,
any admissible outcome can be an equilibrium, depending upon the value of
parameters δ and γ. In particular, if products are suﬃciently close substi-
tutes and firms’ discount factor takes intermediate values, the game produces
two asymmetric equilibria in pure strategies, with firms playing a collusive
price-quantity supergame.
The reason for this result is to be found in the fact that Nash bargaining
over the cartel profits, by increasing (respectively, decreasing) the collusive
profits accruing to the quantity-setter (resp., price-setter) indeed makes col-
lusion in price-quantity settings easier to sustain than it is under equal split.
6 Concluding remarks
We have revisited the long-standing debate about the stability of collusion in
diﬀerentiated duopolies, by nesting the supergame in an extended game with
observable delay, in which firms non-cooperatively select the market variable
in a pre-play stage, in view of the discounted profit flows generated by the
ensuing market supergame.
The analysis of the game where cartel profits are evenly split between
firms has shown that collusion is part of the subgame perfect equilibrium if
and only if both firms are either price- or quantity-setters. Conclusions may
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be drastically diﬀerent if collusive profits are distributed between firms using
a Nash bargaining solution. In such a case, when product diﬀerentiation is
relatively low and firms are suﬃciently myopic, the sustainability of symmet-
ric cartels becomes too demanding and there emerge pure-strategy equilibria
where firms stabilise price-quantity cartels. Therefore, it appears that asym-
metric market behaviour, coupled with Nash bargaining over the additional
cartel profits made available through collusion, can help firms build up stable
cartels. This is an additional reason for antitrust agencies to worry about
implicit collusion, as it adds up to the established theoretical wisdom on the
matter a further source of collusive behaviour that previous literature had
either neglected or simply regarded as a lesser evil. Indeed, this may be due
to the idea that an a priori symmetric duopoly should generate, if at all,
symmetric cartels. the foregoing analysis shows that there are circumstances
where this may not be the case.
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